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THE EVIL ONE: A DEVELOPMENT

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It is proposed in this paper to consider, largely from the standpoint of the philosophy of religion, one religious idea: the idea of a power or powers of evil, or, to grasp the whole in one symbol, the idea of the Evil One. Such a discussion should have its interest. The idea of the Evil One, or the Devil as we commonly call him, is perfectly familiar to the average person. There is no need therefore of any elaborate definings. One has only to note that by the Evil One is meant that force or power which is constitutionally—on principle, one might say, if that phrase did not seem a bit out of place—the champion and fosterer of chaos and discord and calamity, of evil and harm and wickedness in general. Or, to put it negatively,—as we perhaps more often think of it,—the Devil is the leader of the opposition as regards the hopeful, the progressive, the divine, with all the meaning which may be packed into that last word.

Look first, then, at the origin of this idea, so far as one may surmise it. On the stage of primitive religion, the savage sees every day happenings which he does not comprehend, which he therefore refers to powers beyond and above those of men. This notion of superhuman, “supernatural,” actors in the world is natural enough. Early man with a rudimentary sense of orderly thought sets up by this idea of the supernatural a logical classification of that large number of events which for various reasons cannot be fitted into his ordinary relations with the men about him. That the category “supernatural” is always personal for primitive religion is due to the make-up of the savage mind, which is too far from abstruse to be able to grasp the thought of an abstract impersonal action or, as we should say, force. The reasons for assigning events to supernatural agency are chiefly that the happenings in question are odd or affrighting, or perhaps merely incomprehensible. Of course for the savage much comes under these descriptions. The matter may be illustrated from

what is often seen in the life of our domestic animals. When we see the cat start at an unexpected noise, or the horse prick up his ears at a motor-car or an odd-looking pile of wood, we are cognizant of a state of mind which explains much in the past of our race. We are looking on at almost precisely the mood of the savage over against many events in nature about him. The animal forgets, when the queer occurrence is past; but primitive man, already a reasoner, grasps all such events together as similarly based and caused. A surprising fall of a tree, a flood, an eclipse, a fortunate coincidence, such as the appearance of an animal just when one is in dire need of food, the phenomena of insanity or dreams, the stumbling over a stone of peculiar shape or color, the frequent encountering on some one day of one particular species of bird or beast, even the mere feeling that certain places or situations are uncanny,—heights, deep woods,—all these incidents, accidents we should call them, were for primitive man the plain and not unreasonable indications that there was here involved something beyond himself or any man like him. Chance was an explanation foreign and even impossible to him; in fact a high degree of sophistication is in any case demanded to grasp the idea of chance at all. Thus the savage speedily peopled his surroundings with supernatural powers. Where these found their mode of expression chiefly in animals, we have "totemism," in objects "fetichism," in certain men "shamanism." But even where the superhuman was thus localized, the thing was never exclusive. The savage is inevitably a polytheist. Powers of various energy and skill and danger are for him not in his totem or fetich or medicine-man only, they are all about him also.

At the earlier stages primitive men did not distinguish between benevolent and malevolent divinities. It was necessary to propitiate them all and carefully to avoid affronting any power whatever. There was in practice no need to draw a line between the good and the evil powers. It might perhaps be supposed that evil happenings would be ascribed to demons and beneficial ones to gods, but that was not the case. The category of good and evil, helpful and harmful, is very important and keenly remarked by the savage, but it does not give him the clew for making a distinction between good and evil powers. For an evil event may be

due to the displeasure of a being ordinarily well-disposed, while a good event might be the attempt of a really evil power to beguile.

As time goes on, however, this distinction arises; and it probably appears when the savage becomes "acquainted," so to speak, with certain divinities, marking them off and in a way recognizing them. That is to say, some happenings recur and become well-known so that the propitiating activity can be regular and the power in question can be assigned a name, a function, in brief a place in savage society. Now these familiar powers tend to be regarded as gods and friendly, while all others are looked upon as demons and unfriendly, on the general principle of the uncivilized that every stranger is an enemy. Of course under the savage conditions of life, the trustworthy, more or less manageable, powers are few in number, while the unfamiliar are encountered far more often. The savage lives in a world of terror such as we, after centuries of protecting civilization, can probably in no way imagine. He therefore believes, and it is scarcely surprising, in demons and devils more than in gods, just because he is so seldom surely and consciously safe. Savage religion has something of cultus, but much more of that exorcising or conjuring of demons which we call magic. By degrees, with the receding of ineptitude and fear and the advance of security and knowledge of the world and its ways, the gods relatively increase and the demons become less numerous and insistent, relegated to the background—though a very persistent background in all higher religions.

The next step is taken when these superhuman powers begin to take on a degree of order, no longer existing for thought as an unrelated, promiscuous welter of differing individual gods on the one hand and demons on the other. They all exist still but are arranged in a unity of some sort. With the gods this comes in differing ways. It may be that one of them becomes more and more powerful, while the rest come to be correspondingly subordinate and negligible—as in Greece and Rome. Or one deity may rise to an importance such that he is regarded as the only real divinity, of which accordingly all the others are expressions—as Brahma in India. This unifying process is not so common in the case of the evil powers. The tendency in the case of the elevation of the chief or only god is for the evil

ones to fade into mere memories, pale relics and survivals, lurking on as almost ineradicable superstitions among the more ignorant, and ready to revive to titanic energy at any weakness of the older established religions. This last has happened often in the history of religion, witness especially the recrudescence of exorcisms and conjurations and orgiastic rites at a time when the Greek and Roman religions were decrepit and Christianity had not as yet established itself. In the regular order of things, however, when religion is normally strong and commonly accepted, the evil powers become superstitions, as jinns, harpies, gorgons, evil geniuses, were-wolves, vampires, trolls, witches, and the rest.

If this were the only course of development in the ideas as to evil beings, then the discussion of the evil powers in religion would be a plain and simple one. There would be a steady evolution from the savage beliefs and magic in general, with less and less credence till the evil powers were on the point of vanishing altogether,—a result which would really come to pass when education with its salutary mental and spiritual sanitation had become universal. We are obviously far from it as yet, but that point would be a theoretical end of the evil one and all that is his. As matter of fact, however, this steady development toward monistic belief has not been the exclusive type of development, so that the prophecy of a disappearing evil one is not the only outlook. In certain quarters, alongside of the unifying of the gods, the evil powers, too, have coalesced to form an ordered whole over against the good. A classical illustration of the finished result of such a dualistic development is to be found in the later aspect of Persian religion, commonly called Zoroastrianism.

By Zoroastrianism¹ the world is conceived as a great battle-field for a life-and-death struggle between Ormuzd, the power of light, and Ahriman, the power of darkness, each having his numerous henchmen and followers. Ormuzd is the stronger, and is at length to conquer after various cycles of years—there is that degree of monism even here—but at this present the dualism is irreconcilable. The whole world is filled with supernatural

¹ For this sketch of Zoroastrianism I am largely indebted to E. Lehmann, in *Chantepie de la Saussaye, Religionsgeschichte*, 3d edition.

powers, evil as well as good. Of the evil ones, there are devas and druj—demons all over the earth, all about and in us. In every corner they do their baleful work. No home and no individual is free or safe from them. Daily purifications, sacrifices, prayers, exorcisms, and the like are necessary to ward them off. Every sin and shameful act, every suffering and calamity, has its demon. Sickness and death, winter and famine, unchastity and drunkenness, envy and arrogance—these all and every other evil are due to the personal energy of Ahriman and his workers. The domain of the demons upon earth is constantly spreading in certain directions and narrowing in others, for all false thinking and unbelief is an addition to Ahriman's realm. All violent sinners are regarded as his recruits, and after death themselves become demons. In time the Persians came to classify all their political enemies as followers and helpers of Ahriman. So the Turanians, the Greeks and Romans, the Turks and Arabs, are to stand in the last battle between Ormuzd and Ahriman and fight on the side of the evil power. The task of the devas is therefore to wrest from Ormuzd the control of the world. Their method is partly by material calamities and devastations, partly by seducing men, corrupting in all possible ways their virtues. This war is going on in every nook and corner of earth. For every piece of ground which Ormuzd brought into existence at the creation, Ahriman at the same time made something evil which should spoil it,—bad soil or bad climate or poisonous insects or evil passions of men. Barrenness and sterility is always a sign of the evil one's presence. Desert, swamp, and moor, rock and dreary heath, are his favorite dwelling-places. Alike in winter-freezing and in summer-sicknesses the work of Ahriman is plainly apparent. Death is the peculiar element of the devas. When a good man passes away, a druj comes for him with glee, but when an evil person dies, they bear him off with sadness and lamentings in view of the loss thus sustained by the forces of evil upon the earth.

It ought to be noted that this religion is very practical in its moral emphases, all of which rest solidly upon its dualism. Every planting of waste ground, every curing of sickness, every overcoming of sin, is a definite driving out of Ahriman and an

extension of the domain of Ormuzd. Worship and purifications have their place, but they are not all-important. Morals and industry in all practical ways, in ploughing, sowing, digging, casting forth, educating—all that means the banishment of barrenness and waste and filth and ignorance—is a driving away of evil and as much the service of Ormuzd as is any formal worship. Is it not clear that in the Persian development of belief in the evil one there is not so much superstition as a positive and useful morality and religion? The belief in an evil one in the form which it here takes can hardly be put aside with contempt as a mere survival of primitive ideas.

Turn now to a brief consideration of the Hebrew religion in which the figure of an evil power is by some believed to be derived from the Persian ideas just portrayed. The religion of the Hebrews is the more significant in that all the notions of the devil which are found in our Western civilization go back, largely if not wholly, to the Old and New Testaments. Satan—to use his Old Testament title—is a late idea in the religion of the Hebrew scriptures, not making its appearance till such books as Zechariah and Chronicles and Job, while Azazel, undoubtedly resting upon a popular superstition regarding a demon of that name, is mentioned in one of the late portions of Leviticus, itself a late book. The idea of an evil one would thus not appear to be indigenous to the Hebrew religion, probably for the reason that the more religious of the Jews were stiffly monotheistic. There is, indeed, the story of the temptation in the Garden of Eden. The tempter, however, is not Satan but a serpent who speaks,—as do all Æsop's serpents, and on occasion the animals of folk-tales generally. The narrative in the first chapters of Genesis is in fact not a description of historical incidents but a tale, no doubt often retold before it was written down, and designed to account for various things, namely, the uncanny dislike felt by human beings for snakes, the crawling of that animal—plainly a most surprising and humiliating mode of progression, the origin of birth-pangs, the reason of the strange and harsh dispensation whereby men have to toil and to die.² It is not evil in general but certain particular evils upon which in naïve and beautiful folk-fashion this narrative reflects in its picture of the serpent-tempter.

² See Gunkel, *Genesis*, 2d edition, pp. 17-19.

Aside from this exception, which is thus only apparent, the figure of Satan does not appear until the latest books of the Old Testament. Even there, be it noted, Satan is not what he afterward becomes in the development of the Hebrew religion. At his first appearance he is no hostile power of evil over against God, but is a servant of God, returning to him and reporting among the others; so with especial clearness in the prologue to the book of Job. His peculiar task is the accusing of men by reminding God of their evil qualities, as a sort of heavenly "prosecuting attorney." As one scholar puts it, he may be said to personify the judicial severity of God, not opposing but serving and even, in so far, representing God. Even in Job, however, Satan takes a certain delight in his task, and this magnifying of his office helps to explain the full-fledged, God-defying Prince of Evil whom we know in the New Testament.

It should be remarked that the notion of Satan appears not only late but precisely after the exile gave association with Persian ideas, and that it is found during the time of the Persian influence. This suggests that Satan is derived from the Persian Ahriman, just as Persia is certainly responsible for the recrudescence of angels and demons in the later Old Testament period. But the figure of Satan as a servant of God is far removed from the Persian notion of him, and this consideration leads to doubt whether Persian influence be at all the source of the idea of the evil one in Palestine. If the development known to us began with the Apocrypha or the New Testament, Persian influence might be taken for granted, but in view of the characteristics of the evil one at an earlier period, it becomes improbable. It is, further, not impossible to explain the appearance of this figure in Hebrew literature on other grounds. In spite of the silence of the prophets as to Satan or demons, there may well have persisted among the great mass of the people survivals of primitive religious notions as to devils which would have sufficed to produce the Satan of later prophecy and of Job. This is the more likely in that Satan at first appears as one of the angels in Jahveh's service and yet as on the opposite side a paradox,—which looks like the resultant of two different religious ideas, namely, the popular belief in

demons, which has been said ³ to "stand at the beginning of all human religious development," and the stark, unbending monotheism which became for the Jewish nation more and more axiomatic. But at any rate Satan makes his entrance into Hebrew literature as a vassal of Jahveh and not until after the exile, and then presently appears as the traditional opponent of all that is right and good.

In the New Testament we read of demons innumerable, thought of as causing abnormalities and diseases of every kind, but most of all as bringing about mental derangements. The phrase "possessed of a devil" as a synonym for insanity is well known to every reader of the Bible. Another point of view is characteristic of the epistles, where the gods of the heathen are called demons,⁴ a suggestion of which Milton makes splendid use in his catalogue of the nobles of Satan's realm. Theodore Parker came very close to translating it into modern thought when he said to a narrow theologian who ascribed unworthy cruelty to the Divine Being, "Your God is my Devil!" But the New Testament knows not only devils of various sorts: it is certain also of a Devil, the leader and champion of evil, always opposed to God and the good—a single commanding figure gathering up into itself all the appeal and danger and wickedness of sin, called by various names and significations, such as Beelzebub, the prince of the power of the air, the prince of this world, the god of this world, as well as the more familiar devil or evil one. The New Testament is not entirely and consistently sure that all temptation is due to the evil one or his minions. It is sometimes implied that it comes from God, as for example in the Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation!" The Epistle of James ⁵ refers to God's responsibility for our temptation as a current idea which it emphatically denies, ascribing evil solicitations not to God, nor even to Satan, but to one's own evil desires. But, speaking by and large, temptation is in the New Testament ordinarily thought of as coming from the evil one. Sin and the solicitation to sin is his specialty, his department of the activity of the superhuman, spiritual world. More than this, this idea of the devil's

³ Bousset, *Die Religion des Judenthums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, p. 331.

⁴ 1 Corinthians 10 20, 21, cf. 1 Timothy 4 1.

⁵ 1 13, 14.

peculiar work is projected into the past, and, in particular, Satan is identified in the period of the New Testament with the serpent of the Garden of Eden in Genesis. So for the future the work of the evil one is to continue until there comes at length a final catastrophe comparable to a similar casting up of accounts in the Persian religion. In a word, evil and the devil are set over against God from all time and into the dim future, till at last according to the Book of Revelation the devil and his angels are cast into the lake of fire and brimstone.

Advancing with the development of Christianity, we may note that in the writings of the church fathers of the second and third century the devil plays an important rôle. All the Roman imperial system and all that opposed Christianity was regarded as a part of his kingdom. As the prince of this world, he is the rival and caricature of the divine, "God's ape" as Tertullian says. Cyprian calls him "the author of all delusions and heresies." He is the owner of men by reason of their sin, and a release can be obtained only by the death of Christ in which Satan overreached himself—since Christ never sinned, accordingly never deserved death—and was in fact intentionally and most cleverly outwitted. This idea of the atonement as made by a payment to the devil held sway in the church's thinking for over a thousand years, and the same aspect of Satan as one easily hoodwinked appears in many different quarters throughout the centuries. Ben Jonson wrote a play the title of which asserts that "The Devil is an Ass." Many folk-tales tell of peasants who get the better of him, such stories representing the naturalization, even with a play of humor, of the notion of an evil one. This very fact of humorous treatment indicates the great importance of the idea and the deep familiarity of the people with it. In fact, during the Middle Ages in general the belief in the devil was absorbing. Saints and others conceived themselves to be in constant conflict with him. It was a fixed idea with everybody, the climax being reached perhaps in the fifteenth century. Luther, for example, saw and fought the devil more than once. He threw an inkstand at him one day at the Wartburg—the ink-spot resulting is still one of the sights shown to tourists at that castle. In the miracle plays the devil is one of the leading char-

acters, and his figure found its way into greater literature. One need only mention Dante's devil at the centre of the earth, crunching in his three mouths the three arch-traitors, and by the motion of his wings sending a cold wind throughout all hell. Milton's Satan is a magnificent incarnation of indomitable pride and perseverance, who appeals to us by his sublimity and courage far more than he affrights or shocks us—for it is generally agreed that, although the writer meant otherwise, Satan is the hero of *Paradise Lost*. Indeed, the idea of the evil one, so clear-cut and so widely familiar as it had become, was sure to be largely utilized—whether one believed in him or not—as a convenient stock symbol for literature from the middle ages on. It was employed by Marlowe in his *Doctor Faustus*, by Goethe in his *Faust*, with its polished eighteenth-century Mephistopheles, not to pause upon such more recent treatments as Hauff's *Memoiren des Satans* or Molnar's *The Devil* or Andreev's querying, doubting, fearing *Anathema*. All these present and mould the idea in different fashions, recurring to it again and again, as well they may, for it is a deep-lying human notion, leaping out and flaming forth at the slightest opening. One may recall the witch-trials for a sad chapter in this folk-idea, or Mrs. Eddy's "malicious animal magnetism" for a comic one.

But what shall be said as to the religious meaning and validity of this idea of the Evil One? In the first place this at least, that superstition in the strict sense can never have any religious value. Detailed representation of the evil one and his doings may delight children and some few adults with the thrill of its pleasing horrors, but there is in it no more religious meaning than in the tales of the "Invisible Cloak" or "Fortunatus's Purse." The superstitious ideas of the devil which have continued alongside monotheistic religion are only to be reprobated—or laughed at. But, having said this, we must also say that the idea of an evil power over against good is not too hastily to be dubbed either irrelevant or a superstition. It may be an integral part of religion. From the point of view of belief in a power of evil in the world, there are today two types of religion. The one rejects the devil scornfully and contemptuously. The other believes in him; not because it prizes him, but because it regards that

belief as necessary to practical life and morality. To some this statement may sound incredible and even silly. It will lose somewhat of this oddness, however, when I hasten to add that the word "Devil" is meant and used as a convenient symbol for the abstract expression, "a positive and real force of evil."

There are religious men today who assert and believe in the reality of evil and there are those on the other hand who deny its essential existence. Of course we are all familiar with the view of those people—the "tender-minded" Professor James called them—who will never admit that there is any real danger anywhere. These blatant optimists are ever to be met with, they who are sure that, however things may seem, everything is bound to come out right. Another expression of this same state of opinion is yielded by the Christian Scientists with their never-ceasing assertion that all pain is an "error"; and there are also the violent partisans of the "larger hope" who, with Tennyson,

"Can but trust that good shall fall
At last—far off—at last to all,
And every winter change to spring."

All these more or less consciously deny that evil is a fact. Or, to use our symbol, they deny the existence of the Evil One. There is, they admit, sin in the world, but they deem it more accurately described as immaturity—a greenness of the fruit which will be outgrown with time and development. There is harm, calamity, anguish, but our idea that these are evil is due to our limited and distorted vision which is unable to see things whole. Only take the standpoint of an eternal All-knower, and evil is not, has not been, and never will be. It seems to be, it is true, and the saner idealists will even grant it to be a part of experience, but that seeming is not real. The chief exponents of this view of evil—Spinoza in the past, and at present the absolute idealists like Professor Royce—attempt to solve the problem of evil by denying its real existence, or rather—to put it positively—they cut this age-old Gordian knot by asserting roundly and dogmatically the power and ultimate triumph of goodness, breathing their souls full with the certainty that

"God's in his heaven,
All's right with the world."

Now this type of denial of the Evil One has its great value, and even its element of truth. It may be seriously questioned whether men could do their best without a deeply-felt belief, usually vague and inarticulate no doubt, that all, *all* is at bottom properly managed and good. Only so does the work that men do *hold*, so to speak, in place of falling back into the abyss. The positive faith-*motif* which underlies absolute idealism and much of the theoretical denial of evil is deeply practical and religiously helpful; the comfort and hope of it is undeniable. But in the details of its working out, and especially in what it denies, it betrays weakness and even a lack of moral earnestness.

For look at the other type of religious thought in this matter, the point of view which asserts that evil and the powers of evil are real and robustly alive in themselves, as well as in our thought of them. There are at least two considerations in favor of this assertion of the real existence of evil:

First, evil is not usually—so far as experience goes—a negative matter, a sign of immaturity alone or chiefly: it is positive, keenly hurting, affrighting. Look at sin. It is vital, emphatic, no mere lack of goodness. One may theorize in one's study, as though it were negative, but for those who have struggled with a habit that is ruinous, or have felt the grip of a hard temptation, sin is something with its own appealing individuality, with its own thews and muscles, and loves and hates. To put the same matter in another fashion, this is but to say that the evil-minded, the champions of evil, the selfish, are not pale negatives of the righteous; they are living, red-blooded human personalities. Go into politics, fight for a clean municipality, and one must soon realize that evil is, though not so strong in the long run, yet every whit as positive and real a fact as good. It is those who know evil and sin best from their own experience who most naturally accept and assert the reality of evil. We have in our vocabulary—that accumulated insight of many generations—the words “fiendish” and “devilish”; they are positive and for us all they are sometimes the only words that really fit a mood or an action or a person. One need only read of such a character as the sea-captain in Jack London's *Sea-Wolf* or Thénardier in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, to grasp what is meant by the positiveness of the evil in

humanity. So with calamity, sickness, microbes, they are not mere "growing pains"; they have a hateful, devouring, crushing aspect. They live for themselves and against what is for our weal. Physicians know well the uncanny entities, almost individualities, which lurk behind diphtheria or typhoid fever or tuberculosis. We often speak of the "meanness" of *la grippe* or the treachery of typhoid fever. The thing is largely true of all that pains us directly or remotely. In fact, it should be noted that pain, in particular, is for psychology at the present moment not the absence of pleasure, not even the subjectively disagreeable alone; it is regarded as a separate, vital sensation by itself and for itself, sometimes useful, sometimes agreeable even, but always positive. In fine, it is admitted that some evil is only apparent, but much, the great majority of it, is real and emphatic. This all is a fact of experience which can scarcely be gainsaid.

And, secondly, a belief in the reality of evil is necessary to a steady, strenuous, complete morality and so to a true religion. It is well to love goodness and purity and to live in their atmosphere, but there is need often, in this actual world, of fighting evil, too; of withstanding poverty and injustice and crime and self-seeking and other evils without us, and of opposing to the death evil tendencies, lusts, foul thinking, sloth, and all the rest within us. Now for this strenuous struggle with the powers of darkness it is a necessary preliminary that one believe that they are not apparent only, but real and dangerous, having an outcome, if not checked or scotched, which will be actual destruction and even damnation. The existence of the evil one must in so far be an article in our creed, if we are earnestly and with any success to overcome him and his works. A phantom foe will be half-heartedly opposed. A sham fight cannot have in it quite the stir, the verve, the agonizing thrust which a real battle with a real enemy will compel. It is all very well, as a moral holiday now and then, to forget the power and reality of evil in the world, but for that righteous indignation and downright eagerness for purity and justice which must have their places in every life, a belief in the Evil One and his potencies for harm is a mighty and indispensable stimulus.

A word in conclusion as to the modern representatives of what

may be called, not unfairly, a belief in the reality of evil. First and foremost, William James in the last chapter of his *Pragmatism* dwells on the value of appreciating the reality and danger of the struggle with evil, as over against the quietism of the easy "waiting game" of absolutism. Nor is this a matter of the pragmatists alone. It is not far from the truth to say that the reality of the power of evil is congenial to all the present-day opponents of absolute idealism—and these are many, as those acquainted with current philosophy know. These opponents include, besides the pragmatists, the pluralists (not always the same as the pragmatists) and the present-day realists,⁶ definitive opponents of pragmatism whose programme has recently appeared, and who bid fair to become a reigning school in philosophy. One may then be modern, and yet hold that there is a force for evil which exists and may long exist, which may even, as some assert, forever exist. The belief in an Evil One is not necessarily a superstition. To assert it is perhaps nearer the truth than to deny it, though it is granted that much can be said on both sides.

Whether or not one go on to believe that it is characteristic of the real evil in the world to be personal, will depend upon how fundamental to reality of existence the concept of personality is held to be. There are many, like myself, who cannot conceive an impersonal positive force for evil. The important truth, however, the precious result of the long-evolving, religious notion of the Evil One, is not that of the personality or impersonality of evil, still less of a literal traditional Devil in a flaming hell with horns and hoofs and tail and the rest; the vital and valuable residuum of it all is the sober assertion of the real existence in the universe of a positive tendency to harm and destruction and sin and death, which evil tendency it behooves men individually and society collectively to fight at every possible opportunity.

⁶ Because this type of philosophy is less known than it should be among theologians, let me quote here from Professor Perry, himself a realist, in his book, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 329. "Realism . . . rejects the doctrine that things must be good. . . . The universe, or collective totality of being, contains things good, bad, and indifferent. . . . It is the practical function of intelligence, not to read goodness into the facts, but to lay bare the facts in all their indifference and brutality."